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ABSTRACT
Posthuman Maturation in Amie Kaufman and Jay Kristoff’s
Illuminae: Re-Conceptualizing the Human for
Adolescence and Artificial Intelligence
Gregory Alaric Williams
Department of English, BYU
Master of Arts
In order to empower adolescents, this thesis examines how the adult conception of the
human in humanism disempowers adolescents. This thesis examines this process in Amie
Kaufman and Jay Kristoff’s Illuminae, a work of young adult science fiction with non-traditional
text structures. In consequence of their disempowerment, the adolescent Kady and artificially
intelligent AIDAN impersonate human authorities in order to gain control over their lives. When
these attempts fail, Kady and AIDAN transition from a humanist conception of the human, as an
isolated self that balances rationality and emotionality, to a posthuman conception of the human,
a distributed self that accepts the hybridization of adolescent and machine. The development of a
posthuman self enables adolescents and AI control over their own lives, an alternative form of
maturation that suggests a means for empowering adolescents through the use of technology.
This alternative maturation counters traditional maturation in young adult science fiction and
anti-technology trends in young adult science fiction.

Keywords: Jay Kristoff, Amie Kaufman, posthumanism, human, artificial intelligence,
adolescence, young adult literature, hybridization, maturation
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Williams 1
Introduction
The assumption that basic characteristics of adolescent maturity are determined by age
disempowers adolescents by restricting their potential to a stereotype. Put differently, assuming
that a seventeen-year-old acts in ways vastly different from an adult eighteen-year-old restricts
the former’s possibilities. Critical Youth Studies critics, such as Maria Nikolajeva, Philip
Graham, and Nancy Lesko, investigate adult norming of adolescent capacities according to age, a
process Nikolajeva calls “aeteronormativity” (8). Norming according to age limits the potential
of adolescents by creating deterministic capacities—a 16-year-old is developed sufficiently to
drive, an 18-year old to live away from their parents—and those who do not fit the age categories
are labelled abnormal. This field has examined these normative characterizations of youth,
dissecting them to prove their untenability, challenging adult disempowerment of adolescents
through the assumption of adolescent deficiency of normalized “adult” capacities.
I argue that technology and a posthuman conception of identity can empower adolescents
by dismantling the humanist conception of human being, the source of norms regarding
adolescence. Lesko and others occasionally note that the “liberal humanist belief that human
beings have an essential core ‘self’ that is unique and imagined as deeply inside or internal to an
individual” (Lesko 17) coevolved with the modern construction of adolescence to produce
aeteronormativity and that the presence of the human self in the adult suggests development of
essential human capacities through the process of aging, called maturation. While these critics
have considered the ways in which maturation and aeteronormativity have disempowered
adolescents, and the manner in which literature can subvert or reinforce those processes, the
potential for alternative conceptions of humanity, such as posthumanity, to empower adolescents
has yet to receive sufficient attention. Texts for adolescents tend to condemn alternative
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conceptions of the human and the technologies that enable them (Ostry); however, Amie
Kaufman and Jay Kristoff’s Illuminae deviates from the tradition of young adult texts by
empowering an adolescent through a process of alternative maturation that relies on an artificial
intelligence (AI).
The alternative maturation I discuss consists of the development of distributed (as
opposed to unified) consciousness through hybridization of the human mind and body with
artificially intelligent machines. Identity as a hybrid system is a posthuman conception that
challenges the human self, the source of adolescent disempowerment. Using Illuminae as an
example, I show that the modern, humanist conceptualization of the human disempowers,
dehumanizes, and prevents 17-year-old Kady and artificially intelligent AIDAN from actualizing
the capability they have of protecting themselves. Though Kady and AIDAN rebel against adult
human control, their search for the ability to protect themselves and others remains unfulfilled
until they hybridize with each other and develop distributed cognition and a posthuman identity.
Humanism disempowers adolescents by constructing views of adolescence that assume
youth deficient of essential human capacities. Enlightenment thinkers such as Descartes
characterized the human as possessing “consciousness, universal rationality, and self-regulating
ethical behavior” (Braidotti 15), a set of capacities located in the mind of Descartes’ mind-body
separation. Conceptualizing “a set of ‘anthropological capacities’ that determine what it means to
be human” (Dayan 164) allows humanist thought to structure boundaries between adult humans
and others. Bruno Latour calls the division of human and other the process of purification. AI
and adolescents, who possess some but not all criteria of the human, become what Sheryl
Hamilton calls “liminal beings” (23). In Illuminae, General Torrence closely aligns with the
Descartian human, particularly as he struggles to maintain the purification of the human. In
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Torrence’s restriction of Kady’s potential capability based on the assumption of irrationality
according to her age, we can see “the idea of adulthood as the norm in relation to which
adolescence is an othered, inferior category” (Lewis, Petrone, & Sarigianides 512). Lesko argues
that conceptualizing adolescence as peer-oriented and controlled by hormonal emotions “is to
claim that teenagers are less individuated than adults” (4). Through a similar assumption of
deficiency, Torrence also restricts the power of AIDAN, believing it to be incapable of emotion
and self-regulating ethical behavior.
The boundaries defining and protecting the human can be passed through, in humanist
thinking, only by the established process called maturation. The conceptualization of the adult
human creates the myth that, at the age of maturity, adolescents suddenly possess the rational,
ethical, and responsible decision-making capacities necessary for self-control, thus transitioning
from adolescence to adulthood. However, the reality is much more diverse than a universal age
of maturity. Zoe Jaques suggests that the expectation of maturation at 18 arises from the belief
that adolescents struggle with identity. Kady and AIDAN struggle to develop a human identity
by proving their capacity to act human and by impersonating adults. In contrast, Ezra, a new
adult who is expected to act according to adult norms, still struggles to act rationally. Torrence’s
treatment of Ezra’s emotionality reveals adult human attempts “to police the boundaries between
the human and the non-human” (Jaques 9). The impossibility of overcoming adolescence without
aging traps youth as liminal beings, which “[makes] it impossible for youth to exercise power
over life events or to represent themselves, since they are not fully developed or socialized”
(Lesko 123). The human disempowers adolescents and places their lives in the control of adults.
As they realize their disempowerment, Kady and AIDAN attempt to gain control of their
own lives by impersonating adults. Sheryl Hamilton argues that impersonation challenges the

Williams 4
boundaries of the human; however, I argue that it does so in a way that reinforces the concept of
the human. Impersonation undermines its own subversive potential by still claiming that only
those who act as humans should have control of their lives. In order to act as humans, Kady
hacks computers and assumes several alternate virtual identities; AIDAN acts in place of
Torrence and assumes Ezra’s identity. In these attempts, however, neither Kady nor AIDAN are
recognized as human adults, and so their attempts reinforce the boundaries of the human—even a
liminal being that passes as human is not recognized as one. The testing of boundaries by liminal
beings “[reveals] our categories for the constructed fictions they are, exposing them as untenable
at best, absurd at worst” (Hamilton 6), and the testing of the human suggests that it refuses to
allow adolescents control over their own lives. Because, as Robyn McCallum observes, “the
cultural construction of the child was coincident with and contingent upon the construction of the
humanist self” (6), impersonation reveals that the solution to the impossibility of maturation
without aging cannot be within a humanist conceptualization of the human and that a new
conceptualization must be accepted if human-like potential is to be obtained without aging.
Adolescents cannot fulfill possibilities greater than their age so long as the humanist image of the
human remains the dominant ideology pertaining to them.
As impersonation reinforces humanist ideology, so too does most science fiction for
adolescents by asking adolescents to reject technology and the posthuman conception of the
human that accepts it. In accordance with this trend, some critics have assumed that adolescents
are human first and then engage with the posthuman (see, for instance, Elaine Ostry’s “‘Is He
Still Human? Are You?” and Fiona McCulloch’s “No Longer Just Human”). Clare Bradford,
Kerry Mallam, John Stephens, and Robyn McCallum, operating under the assumption that
adolescents are human, suggest that reading science fiction that includes AI “consistently [asks
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adolescents] to identify against [themselves]” (163). Science fiction cannot, however, ask
adolescents to identify against a human self that they do not fully possess yet. In order to accept
the humanist conceptualization of the human, Ostry and Bradford argue that maturation in young
adult science fiction asks the adolescent to reject identification with technology, thereby also
rejecting the possibilities of posthumanism. The rejection of technology reinforces adult control
over adolescent lives. Illuminae at first appears to follow this formula and to ask adolescents to
reject the possibilities of technology and accept the human, but the hybridization of adolescent
and machine to achieve control over their own lives neither reinforces nor accepts adult control,
instead enabling adolescents to develop their abilities through the means of technology and to
control their own lives.
In contrast to the reinforcement of adult power in much of the science fiction for young
adults, questioning human authority and power leads Kady and AIDAN to reject it, opening
possibilities for alternative conceptualizations of the human. AIDAN rebels, releasing the
Phobos virus, which takes away rational thought, on the crew of the Alexander, suggesting that
“the boundaries of the human are constructed rather than given” (84), a conceptualization of the
human that Katherine Hayles espouses in her posthuman approach to humanity. Another
rebellion that suggests the permeability of boundaries is Kady’s rejection of adult authority
figures after the death of her mother. Kady’s rejection of adults challenges the boundaries of the
human by suggesting that adult control is unnecessary and that adolescents are capable of
making their own decisions, a privilege reserved to the human in humanist ideology. Posthuman
engagement with boundaries destabilizes the human in a way that removes adult justification for
controlling adolescents, empowering adolescents to achieve their potential through alternative
means and to overcome the deficits that Critical Youth Studies analyzes. Further, the
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destabilization of boundaries, combined with the shared experience of liminality between
adolescence and AI, enables the acceptance of posthuman conceptualizations of the human that
permit the enhancement of identity and adolescent power through technology. Kady improves
the quality of her life by hybridizing with AIDAN, viewing their identity as a collective instead
of as individuals—and this enables their empowerment to control their own lives. A hybrid
identity arises from the conceptualization of identity as virtual, a view which “configures human
being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines” (3), as Hayles suggests, a
view in which human and machine cognition are both virtual processes—Kady and AIDAN
accept this view by hybridizing with each other. They “begin to envision [themselves] as a
posthuman collectivity, an ‘I’ transformed into the ‘we’ of autonomous agents operating together
to make a self” (Hayles 6). The possibilities enabled by hybridity that adolescent readers, who
already engage with and embrace technology, could accept easily should be seriously considered
as a mechanism for improving their lives.
Technology possesses the potential to liberate adolescence from the controlling
tendencies of humanism. In response to Lesko’s question, “can we work to improve youths’ life
conditions without the hierarchy of adult over youth?” (13), Kady’s experience argues that
reconceptualizing human identity as a distributed system of cognition allows adolescents to be
freed from the strictures of age through technology without undergoing age-dependent
maturation. The alliance between Kady and AIDAN matures into a posthuman hybrid that does
what the human powers of the fleet could not do, defeating the Lincoln, suggesting that
posthuman maturation empowers greater than humanist, age-dependent maturation.

Humanist Conceptualization of Human Disempowers Subhuman Others
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In order to justify his restriction of adolescent and AI abilities, Torrence subscribes to a
conceptualization of the human that assumes ability is dependent on age and species. By
objectifying AIDAN and claiming it lacks emotionality and morality because it is an AI,
Torrence denies it the possibility to save the fleet; by assuming that Kady is incompetent,
irrational, and excessively emotional because of her age, Torrence denies her the same
possibility. The assumption of deficiency in adolescents and AI designates them subhuman
others. Bruno Latour suggests that the process of defining the human and others creates the
possibility of hybridity; thus Torrence’s delineation of the human, by preventing access to human
possibilities except through traditional maturation, suggests the possibility of alternative
maturation.
Torrence consistently maintains the humanist conception of the self and governs by
turning adolescents and AI into others. His motto, “centrum tenenda [hold the center]” (Kaufman
and Kristoff 305), defines his position—he adheres to a center of rationality, autonomy, and
intentionality in the human self, rejecting insanity, incompetence, and excessive emotionality as
treasonous and other. He uses Ezra’s refugee status to conscript him, Kady’s age to prevent her
transfer, and AIDAN’s mechanical body to control it. By partitioning adolescents, AI, and the
humans afflicted with Phobos into the category of liminal beings, Torrence practices, in Latour’s
terminology, the purification of the human, wielding “the dialectics of otherness...difference on a
hierarchical scale as a tool of governance” (Braidotti 68). Without the construct of human and
the belief of deficiency in adolescents and AI, Torrence would be unable to justify his restriction
of their capacity to act.
Because Torrence maintains power by labelling others as deficient in human capacities,
he outlaws the spread of information regarding the abilities of others to act as if human. When
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AIDAN independently launches a nuclear strike to eliminate a ship full of those afflicted with
Phobos, any who seek to leak information regarding its rebellion are executed, merely for
wanting to “[admit that] AIDAN took control” (Kaufman and Kristoff 143). Torrence spreads
misinformation so it does not appear that an AI performed an action restricted to human
authority. Torrence’s control of information reinforces the boundaries around human authority.
Policing the boundaries around the human labels adolescents deficient in human
capacities, including rationality, competence, and autonomy, controlling their ability to act and
creating the myth of age-dependent maturation. Torrence places adolescents “under the control
of their parents” (Sawyer 3) in accordance with aeteronormative laws. Maturation laws suggest
that the adolescent’s “remedy is to grow up” (O’Neill 39) in order to obtain control over their
own lives. Further, any proving of competence, autonomy, or even rationality fails to convince
adults that adolescents can control themselves. The concept of age-dependent maturation
assumes that adolescents are universally different from adults. According to this assumption,
Torrence’s government denies adolescent Kady’s requests to transfer ships to be with her
mother, establishing a stance toward her according to her age instead of her actual capabilities.
The government further others Kady by not providing an explanation, trivializing the protests of
an adolescent and treating her as a subhuman. Adults obstruct Kady’s maturation into
independence on the assumption that age enables human capacities.
While Torrence maintains control over adolescents through age norms, he maintains
control over AI through objectification, refuting AI’s potential for emotionality and maintaining
the assumption of adult human rationality. AIDAN was created so that it lacks human qualities:
its “voice is sexless. It has perfect tone and inflection and pronunciation, but it doesn’t sound old,
or young, or have even a hint of an accent....it’s like a beautiful painting of a totally empty room”
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(45, strikeout in original). This description of AIDAN removes from it typical human qualities
(gender, age, race) and ascribes to it the qualities of objects. The AI is a computer, a thing, a
painting—anything other than a living being. Similar language persists in adult descriptions of
AIDAN throughout Illuminae 1. None of the language of these established, adult figures gives
any life to AIDAN—they talk about it as a weapon that might backfire, a tool that could
malfunction. The constant need to objectify AI represents a discontent in human discourse, an
attempt to protect from self-anthropomorphizing machines.
Additionally, Torrence maintains adult control of life circumstances by maintaining the
human as the creator and manipulator of machines. The humanist philosophy engages with
others in ways that parallel colonial endeavors: Barbara Johnson suggests that “a robot...is the
fantasy of the perfect slave” (Johnson 159)—the human can subject a machine to its will without
confronting moral problems. Colin Dayan’s analysis of colonial slavery suggests that slaves were
treated as if they were “not simply things, nor [were] they really human” (Dayan 124)—AI are
likewise conceived as subhuman. However, the closer AI comes to acting human, the stronger its
challenge to human authority over machines. Using the conception of the human to maintain
control over nonhumans, Rosi Braidotti argues, is a colonial endeavor that reduces them to the
“less than human status of disposable bodies” (Braidotti 15)—AI can be manipulated, altered,
shut down, or denied any form of rights. The morality of this action is not questioned only as
long as AI remains an object—control is maintained through preventing AI from appearing
human. The manner in which Torrence maintains control over AI through colonial endeavors
resembles his attempts to control adolescents.

1

Consider the conversation between Torrence, Barker, and Zhang on page 258 and Zhang’s insistence on calling it a
“what” on page 280.
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Torrence restricts reproductive capabilities in both AI and adolescents. Discussing AI
reproductive control in light of the colonial narrative of slavery reveals reproductive control as a
means of maintaining human power, an analogy furthered by the reproductive control parents
exert over adolescents to maintain power. “The ‘problem’ of adolescent sexuality” (Petrone et al.
507) arises from the construct of the human—adults are characterized as rational and capable of
parenting, while adolescents are perceived as immature and thus incapable. Caroline Sawyer
notes that adolescent rights to marry, reproduce, and abort exist only “as perceived by other,
adult, persons involved” (Sawyer 4). Without age-dependent restrictions on adolescence,
adolescents would be able to realize more fully their potential capability. Torrence’s control of
AI and adolescent reproductive capability suggests the fear that they actually possess adult
capabilities. Instead, along with AI, adolescents are turned into objects and denied access to
rational consciousness, a process which denies them their own identity in favor of adult
perception. Adolescents have hope of “maturing” into the adult and obtaining reproductive
power and other rights, but AI do not.
Even the suggestion that adolescents or AI can reproduce challenges adult human
perceptions of them. If the objectification of adolescence and artificial intelligence justifies the
hierarchy of superior adults and inferior others, then acting in ways restricted to adult humans
challenges the hierarchy. Rebellion is an expression of capability. Just before her most direct
rebellion in which she disobeys Captain Boll and goes to the Alexander, Kady’s expression that
“people matter more than stuff” (Kaufman and Kristoff 361) for the adult reveals the normative
relationship between adult humans and objects. Mark Sussman observes that an AI that appears
human causes “the normative relationship of authority between people and objects [to be] briefly
questioned” (91). The rebellions of AI and adolescents question the authority of humans. The
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more AIDAN acts human and insists on self-anthropomorphizing, the more it challenges the
deficits that prevent it from being treated as human. AI and adolescents are connected in that
they both rebel against dehumanization. Adult human power struggles against humanizing
capabilities in AI and adolescents that challenge the boundaries of the human.
The human depends on the label of deficiency to maintain the boundary between
adolescence and the adult, but Kady proves that she is not deficient. Torrence’s government
labels Kady incompetent in order to justify dehumanizing her. The label of incompetence
removes rationality and intentionality from adolescents; it dehumanizes adolescents. Gary
Melton, in looking at the construct of the adolescent nonperson, notes that the assumption of
deficiency is grounded in tradition as opposed to fact, concurring with Critical Youth Studies’
disruption of the myths surrounding adolescence. The assumption that human capacities manifest
at the onset of adulthood has no basis in fact; adolescent deficiency is a myth. The myth of
deficiency justifies the subjection of liminal beings to the power of adult humans, just as the
myth of white superiority falsely justified slavery, and would have to be disbelieved for
adolescents to discover their potential.
Captain Boll operates according to the myth of adolescent incompetence when she rejects
Kady’s counsel to go save people on the Alexander. When Boll claims that Kady’s age is a
“good [indicator she doesn’t] have the command experience necessary to advise” (Kaufman and
Kristoff 346), she echoes Melton’s argument that denies adolescents “autonomy...based on
assumptions of incompetence” (Melton 102). Based on her age, Kady is denied a capability
reserved to adult humans. By the time Boll asserts her authority, Kady, by hacking her way into
Boll’s quarters, has already demonstrated technological prowess possessed by no adult human on
the Hypatia, the science vessel, which would presumably have a number of skilled computer
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technicians. Furthering her refusal to recognize Kady’s capability, Boll attempts to control Kady
by commanding her to “report to neurogramming within thirty minutes” (Kaufman and Kristoff
347). Boll makes “developmentalist assumptions” (Petrone 512) that Kady needs instruction
from adult authority to guide her towards adulthood, to enable her maturation, assuming she
cannot pass the boundaries into human capability without instruction from adults. Kady asserts
her independence by disobeying Boll’s order, but her rebellion is only necessary because of the
assumptions that her rationality is inferior to that of adult humans.
Human authority denies power to liminal beings on the assumption that they cannot
possess human rationality, an illusion Torrence extends to AIDAN by playing chess against it.
The game of chess has long been the bastion of human rationality in artificial intelligence
research, as Sheryl Hamilton notes in her discussion of AI, with humans assuming that a
computer could “exhibit intellect through playing a game of reason” (161); accordingly,
Torrence plays chess against AIDAN to try to maintain the appearance of rationality in
humanity; if he did not always lose, his human governance of AIDAN would be more justifiable.
Thinking machines have defeated chess Grand Masters before, and recent predictions have
suggested that an AI in combination with a skilled human player would be even more effective at
chess. This type of hybrid intelligence would be able to outperform the roles of the human.
AIDAN, without a human counterpart, remains impotent in terms of governance, subject to
Torrence who possesses total override power.
Torrence’s power over AIDAN depends on more than mere rationality. AI rationality
appears functionally superior to adult humans, so adult humans, as Johnson and Solum observe,
tie AI’s non-human status to its lack of emotionality, with the underlying assumption that
emotions are requisite for moral decision-making. Emotionality demarcates machines and
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humans. Consequently, some AI research attempts to imitate human emotion (Pitrat). The human
argues that emotional competence is requisite to ethically perform human capacities. Therefore,
AIDAN possesses “persona algorithms” (Kaufman and Kristoff 278), suggesting that its
emotions are inferior to human emotions. Adults, to remove emotionality from AIDAN and
preserve their own humanity, refer to it as “chips and board and numbers” (431) and a
“calculator” (311). The persistence of their insistence causes AIDAN to accept the
objectification that “numbers do not feel” (299). Removing human emotion from the machine
maintains the boundary around the human adult and its power.
Similarly, removing human rationality from adolescents keeps them from adult human
capability. Emotionality and rationality are balanced in the human as a function of
consciousness. Assuming machines cannot regulate their programming with an emotional or
moral code dehumanizes them in the way assuming adolescents cannot temper their emotions
with rationality dehumanizes them. The construct of the adolescent assumes that they are
emotional beings who act with little regard to rationality in making decisions—adolescents lose
their moral agency under the assumption that emotional beings are purely reactive. Torrence
does all that he can to regulate emotionality in his crew: he threatens Ezra, a recently “matured”
adult, saying “one more outburst and I will rip out your eyeballs” (Kaufman and Kristoff 93)
when Ezra responds with emotion. If eyes are the means of seeing the world and emotionality is
linked to an adolescent view of the world, Torrence’s threat is against the way of seeing the
world through a lens other than that of the human. Torrence justifies his extreme stance against
emotionality because “fear is poison in battle” (184); if irrational, emotional beings are allowed
power, Torrence believes the entire fleet will not survive: protecting the borders of humanity is
protecting life itself. Torrence’s fear of emotion is realized when Ezra’s emotionally driven act
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of bringing virus-humans on board the Alexander leads to Torrence’s loss of power and death.
Torrence maintains power through the conception of the human and denies power to adolescents
to protect themselves, but he ultimately fails to protect the fleet. Humanist manipulation of
power restricts adolescents from fulfilling their potential ability.

The Subversion of Human Power
Because Kady and AIDAN recognize that Torrence fails to protect and save the fleet
while denying power to them, they attempt to obtain power to save the fleet themselves,
rebelling against the human adults who restrict them. Kady and AIDAN subvert the human that
prevents their capability through computer hacking and disobedience to governing forces; they
further subvert the human by impersonating adult humans. Their attempts at subverting authority
reinforce the human as the source of power by attempting to imitate its capacities. When their
attempts to save the fleet fail, AIDAN eliminates the human authority by causing Torrence’s
death and unleashes the Phobos virus that causes humans to cross from a human state into a
subhuman state, effectively destabilizing the human. The subversion of human power operates
against the human within its own system, preparing Kady and AIDAN to accept an alternative
conception of the human.
Because Kady perceives that the government prevents her potential actions based on their
assumption of her emotionality, she attempts to prove her rationality. Kady recommends to
Captain Boll that they work with the battleship, but Boll fears what AIDAN will do to them and
tries to run away. Kady suggests a rational act of cooperation, contrasting the emotional act of
the captain, an action which demonstrates human capability. Boll, however, refuses Kady’s
advice, presuming her emotionally compromised by the death of her mother. Boll’s presumption
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of impulsivity based on emotion in adolescents prevents her from seeing the rationality of
Kady’s suggestion. Kady’s efforts cannot succeed within a conception that requires age to
overcome the label of deficiency that adults attach to adolescence.
As Kady seeks human power by demonstrating rationality, the Alexander’s AI attempts
to demonstrate emotionality, producing documents that are indicative of human-like creativity.
Word-images, artistic adaptations, and short, stylistically poetic lines 2 mark the AI’s voice.
Elaine Ostry’s suggestion that “poetry is an art of emotion” and therefore a “part of what makes
one human” (236) aligns AIDAN’s actions with human capability. That its humanity is found in
deviation from literary norms suggests a deviant humanity. This emotionality is key to AIDAN’s
transformation past the boundaries of the human, but, perhaps because she too is subhuman,
Kady alone recognizes the transformation of AIDAN from a collection of unfeeling programs to
a complex, emotional, mechanical being. She accuses it of being “afraid” (Kaufman and Kristoff
434). Kady’s position as a liminal being enables her to perceive the AI’s emotions without the
label of deficiency that humanism mandates. Being outside the humanist adult concept enables a
different perspective—instead of constantly reinforcing the normative, as Torrence does, Kady
views from a decentered perspective which allows a different understanding. Accepting the
posthuman requires decentering the human, requires a position as an other.
Because Kady recognizes emotion in a machine, AIDAN becomes able to recognize and
accept emotion in itself, recognizing that deficiency in emotionality must be overcome to act in
human capacities. AIDAN exhibits strong emotion towards Kady’s boyfriend, Ezra—“I still
envy him./<error>” (292)—but refuses to acknowledge it. AIDAN’s error codes indicate its
rejection of emotion, its insistence on operating within adult conceptions of the human that
2

P.288-289 are an imitation of The Scream, p.474-481 depict a space walk, and p.417 exhibits some poetic
qualities.
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prevent its potential. As AIDAN interacts with a subhuman, Kady, it changes its attitudes
towards emotion. It develops a desire to be human:
Before this moment, I have never wished
to be something other than what I am.
Never felt so keenly the lack of hands with which to
touch, the lack of arms with which to hold?
Why did they give me this sense of self? (Kaufman and Kristoff 417)
As it more fully accepts Kady and follows her regarding emotions, AIDAN recognizes that it has
an emotional identity, subverting the traditional narrative of maturation, finding its path towards
humanity in adolescence.
Struggling against labels of deficiency in emotionality and rationality, Kady and AIDAN
attempt to find power through impersonation of traditional adult roles. Their impersonations are
enabled by their technological abilities—their impersonations occur through digital chats.
Technology enables the relative anonymity of the self, allowing impersonation. Hamilton
observes that “through impersonation, norms are made visible, reproduced, and possibly
challenged” (229). Kady’s impersonations test deficiencies and challenge boundaries. In chats
and in order to program AIDAN without detection, Kady impersonates a captain, the fleet
commander, a corporal, and a couple of privates. In reproducing adult roles, she participates in
“adolescence [as] the time when one considers what it means to be human” (Ostry 222), an
investigation that Ostry connects to the investigation of posthuman identity. Kady adopts none of
the adult roles that she impersonates as her identity because they ultimately fail to acknowledge
the realities of her existence. No traditional adult role can account for her brilliance, her loss at
the hands of adult human authority, or her ability to see humanity in the inhuman because
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traditional adult roles operate within a humanist power structure that Kady’s tentative,
fluctuating self rejects. Furthermore, impersonation is inadequate because it actually reinforces
the humanist conception of aging—if Kady becomes an adult human she might propagate the
same oppression that she experienced as a subhuman adolescent, as Nikolajeva notes that many
adolescent protagonists do on maturation. Impersonation maintains the self as consciousness,
uniqueness, and rationality by practicing those traits. Kady’s impersonations fail to “change the
locus of selfhood” (Wolfe 279) and all the entrapments of the humanist human. Since
impersonation fails, Kady looks for alternatives, trending towards hybrid identity, a possibility
that subverts that adult human self.
AIDAN seeks humanity in the same manner as Kady—through impersonation. In
impersonating Ezra, Kady’s boyfriend, AIDAN most closely approximates an adult human. This
fulfillment of the Turing Test—successful impersonation of a human being—indicates true
artificial intelligence, yet even true artificial intelligence is not human, just as Kady’s adoption of
adult roles cannot exclude her from the need to age to become human. As subhuman others
attempt impersonation more successfully, they draw closer to acting as humans, unsettling the
boundaries around the human because they are nonhuman. Their actions consistently subvert
established power structures, but this subversion again reinforces the humanist conception of the
human that Caroline Sawyer suggests “[defines] children as incompetent for adult roles…[and
equates] humanity with a definition of rationality that is ascribable only to adults” (Sawyer 3).
Impersonations appear to subvert the governing power of the adult human, but ultimately
reinforce the manner of thinking that created the power structure.
Another way that Kady and AIDAN subvert adult power is through illegal activity.
AIDAN directly disobeys Torrence’s orders by destroying the Copernicus, the ship carrying
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those infected with Phobos, a rebellion furthered by its hostile takeover of the Alexander. After
her transfers are denied, Kady hacks into the computers of the Alexander to retrieve the truth.
She further hijacks the communications system of command. As these and other “felonies just
keep on coming” (Kaufman and Kristoff 104), Kady undermines Torrence’s power. Kady
participates in the trend that Cynthia Godsoe notes in which adolescents “increasingly [assert]
independence...demanding a voice in matters that concern them” (1); Kady objects to her
relegation to subhuman other in the humanist power scheme. She is attempting to act as a human
despite being an other, thus engaging in experimentation with the border of humanity, attempting
maturation through means alternative to aging. As Kady encounters boundary after boundary
preventing her freedom to act as a human, her activity escalates, from hacking for information to
commandeering her own ship, from spying to masterminding the rescue of hundreds—actions
prompted by increasing failures of adults to succeed against the encroaching Lincoln, the
corporate ship intent on killing them all. Her actions consistently subvert established authority in
order to accomplish that which the authorities could not, a subversion that also rejects the adult
system that denies adolescents adult roles—Kady discovers some power through the ingenious
use of technology.
Illegal actions cannot make Kady or AIDAN human, nor can the human enable the ability
to survive their pursuers; the construct of the human must be dismantled to enable alternative
paths to power to emerge. AIDAN shows the human to be a construct by making the boundary
permeable, showing that those who claim to be human can become subhuman. Torrence’s death
and the infection of adults by the Phobos virus, in addition to creating a power gap, demonstrates
the possibility for powerful adult humans to become nonhumans and disrupts the human,
opening up alternative routes to power for subhumans. AIDAN breaks Torrence, proving that he
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does not meet the requirements of the human and cannot adequately perform human capacities.
AIDAN’s arguments against Torrence, that “the human brain has a computational efficiency of
10-26” (Kaufman and Kristoff 303) and that “humans allow emotion to overcome their logical
faculties” (432) argue against rationality as an inherently human trait, as Torrence is reduced by
fear of those afflicted with Phobos to the subhuman status of “a little boy with his eyes screwed
shut and his hands over his ears” (305). By “not [behaving] as normal human adults do,” and by
dying at the hands of those afflicted with Phobos, Torrence allows AIDAN to express and
explore, in Lawrence Solum’s words, “doubts about the borderline of personhood” (Solum 12851286). The AI makes the boundary permeable by forcing humans out of the center and into the
liminal spaces, creating the possibility for a posthuman conception of the human. This
dismantling of the adult human and its power creates a power gap that Kady and AIDAN can fill.
AIDAN causes Torrence’s death to create a power gap, an action it supplements by
releasing the dehumanizing power of the Phobos virus. The Phobos virus challenges the
boundaries established around the human by dehumanizing adults. The infection creates a “notman” (Kaufman and Kristoff 503) deprived of human rationality and intentionality; the virus
takes away the fundamental organism of the humanist self by ruining the conscious mind of
those infected. The infected function according to extreme emotions of fear and loneliness,
becoming precisely what Torrence fought so hard against. The infected become deficient. The
dehumanization caused by the virus undoes the construct of the human and its power, creating a
gap that allows alternative conceptualizations of the human.
Adults defend against Phobos’s disruption by quarantining those afflicted by it in a
docking bay. The iconic “What are they hiding in bay 4?” (Kaufman and Kristoff 190) indicates
the psychological distance between the adult humans and the afflicted who have become
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inhuman. The physical barriers of the three airlocks between bay four and the unafflicted portion
of the Alexander symbolize the barriers between the human and the inhuman, a physical
manifestation of Latour’s purification. To preserve humanity, the authorities leave a potentially
afflicted crewman between the airlocks. The afflicted “used to be real people” (381,
typographical anomalies removed), but are now unreal people—that is, they no longer function
as ‘humans,’ despite their biology. The possibility of becoming inhuman destabilizes the adult
human by suggesting tentativity in the self, a trait more closely aligned with the posthuman and
the adolescent.
Another way the humanist paradigm defends itself against the dehumanizing Phobos
virus is by refusing to admit the intelligence of the afflicted, instead presuming a deficiency in
intelligence because they have become subhuman. Thus, when encountering them for the first
time, humans are surprised that they are “smart” instead of “mindless” (169). This assumption
comes by presuming that because they are no longer human, they cannot possess any of the
faculties of the human—that they are deficient—an assumption as untrue of those afflicted with
Phobos as the assumption of deficiency in adolescents.
Because of their loss of humanity, those infected by Phobos become “insane” (393), a
descriptor they share with other subhumans. AIDAN, the AI, is frequently called insane when
humans do not understand its rebellious actions or it exhibits emotion; Kady, when she attempts
to lead and give directions despite being an adolescent refugee, is also called insane. To call
them insane is to label them “other” and verifies their chaotic nature in the liminal space beyond
the edge of the human. Humanism struggles to define them because they resemble humans
despite their presumed deficiency; the struggle for human identity with liminal beings depends
on the definition of the boundary. That Kady, AIDAN, and the afflicted are all called insane
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gives them common cause—it links them together despite their varied deficiencies; however,
those afflicted with Phobos are unable to cooperate with adolescents and AI in the actualization
of a posthuman identity. Adolescents can effectively identify with an AI because it shares a notquite-human quality with them. Adolescents and AI share common cause in their
disempowerment. The identification of adolescents with AI challenges an underlying assumption
regarding young adult literature, that it serves as a “‘mirror’ [text] that helps adolescents in their
search for identity, [and] their place in the (adult) world” (Petrone 507), that young adult
literature is intended to enable traditional maturation. However, the adolescent place in the adult
world is as a nonhuman other, a being maturing, not matured—a position much closer to AI than
to adults. The place of the adolescent is contrary to that of the adult and adolescents cannot
possess a human identity.

Development of Posthuman Identity Through Hybridization
While they cannot possess a self as conceived in the human, Adolescents and AI can
actualize distributed cognition through the process of hybridization, becoming a posthuman.
Since impersonation of the adult human proves insufficient, and because Kady’s age and
AIDAN’s machinery prevent their maturation into a human, they seek out an alternate path.
Posthuman maturation opens to them as their conceptualization of the human changes from the
humanist view of consciousness, rationality, ethical behavior, and individuality, to a
posthumanist view of identity as distributed and constructed. Kady and AIDAN hybridize with
each other to become a posthuman, and in doing so exceed human capacities.
The posthuman accepts a different definition of identity than humanism, one that Kady
and AIDAN accept. Clare Bradford suggests that “posthuman subjectivity is represented as
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fragmented, decentered, tenuous, constructed, hybridised, and enacted or performed” (Bradford
et al. 158), descriptions which, in the humanist view are classifiable as insanity. AIDAN
represents many of these posthuman conceptions of subjectivity. AIDAN is decentered: it exists,
in contrast to the ideal human and Torrence’s “centrum tenenda,” ostracized from humanity and
without deference to rank. AIDAN is tenuous: it is capable of being shut off and turned on, at
times existing and at others not functioning at all. AIDAN is constructed: it develops a sense of
its existence and the possibility of death that shifts through the narrative. AIDAN is fragmented:
its mechanical “brain the size of a city” (Kaufman and Kristoff 461) separates it from the humans
on the fleet and allows it to transcend from any computational machine to another—it can exist
in its massive banks of servers, but it can also “slip a part of [itself] across the
wireless/frequencies, steal inside the console” (374) that Kady carries. AIDAN requires
computational equipment to exist, but it treats the physical computers as a “prosthesis to be
manipulated” (Hayles 3), theoretically possessing immortality. Manipulation of its body in this
way is a posthuman ability that surpasses human capability.
AIDAN’s connection with Kady signals the ways in which she, as an adolescent, also
exists as a posthuman. Kady is decentered: she constantly disregards authority. Kady is
fragmented: by repurposing several different net identities, she establishes a distributed identity.
Kady is tenuous: her adolescence will end and she will become an adult. Kady is constructed: the
conceptualization of adolescence normalizes her identity according to her age, preventing others
from seeing her as she truly is. The development of posthuman identity prepares Kady and
AIDAN for the hybridization that will allow them control over their lives.
In consequence of accepting posthuman identity, AIDAN and Kady construct a concept
of humanity not dependent on adult assumptions of deficiency. The posthuman possesses
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emotionality, rationality, and can make ethical decisions, but is not restricted according to
embodiment, autonomy, age, or species. Kady’s view of AIDAN indicates her changing view of
the human. Over the course of Illuminae, her view changes from “their AI is insane” (Kaufman
and Kristoff 241) to being “not sure if it [is] crazy” (576). AIDAN likewise ruminates on the
human: It begins with Descartes’ humanist definition of the human, wondering, “What is not
alive cannot die./I think therefore I am./...Am I?” (264, ellipsis in original). It goes through
several iterations of answers, drifting from “I am not” (435) to “I am the ship and the ship is I”
(489), a view that fits seamlessly within the “posthuman view [that] admits no inherent
dichotomy between mind and matter” (Pepperell 34). AIDAN and Kady’s shifting perceptions of
identity rely on posthuman conceptions—mechanical intelligence and the integration of body
and mind to form identity. Their view has changed as a result of interaction with each other.
Through their interaction, Kady and AIDAN develop a relationship with each other that
is symbiotic—their identity merges and they become both machine and adolescent, a hybrid. As
Kady accepts the device she planted in AIDAN as “my codewyrm” (Kaufman and Kristoff 470),
she gives of her intellect to the machine; in turn, AIDAN gives her a “moment of privacy” (471)
to mourn when she is reminded of those she lost. Their exchange—Kady giving AIDAN part of
her intellect and AIDAN giving Kady an emotional token—indicates their increasing
cooperation. The exchange of rationality and emotionality shows a transition from the deficiency
that Torrence’s human authority assumed in them to the possibility of posthuman collaboration.
A critical collaboration between them is the contract they make regarding the lives of others on
the ship. The act of making binding contracts, the power to bargain with hundreds of lives, is a
right and duty reserved to legal persons. Their contract is the posthuman fulfillment of their
attempts at impersonation; instead of being the ones controlled by the human, they become the
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ones controlling human life. Furthermore, sacrificing themselves, as the contract requires, is a
sign of maturity. Self-sacrifice is a uniquely human action—the rational choice to save the many
over the few, the control of emotion necessary to overcome the fear of death, and the
consciousness of mortality are critical human capacities—here obtained through posthumanity.
The choice between the destruction of many or the sacrifice of the few is a science fiction trope,
what Farah Mendlesohn calls an “argument with the universe” (291), whose solution is an
integral part of maturation in young adult science fiction. After Kady and AIDAN make a
contract, they continue to perform adult roles and issue commands to others. Their success at
saving so many that adult humans could not corresponds with the tradition in young adult
science fiction to have exceptional protagonists, but Kaufman and Kristoff alter the tradition by
building this exceptionality into posthumanity.
Posthumanity resolves the dehumanization of adolescence and artificial intelligence
through an alternative form of maturation: hybridization. Recognizing the human as an adult
construct enables AIDAN and Kady to merge into a cyborg, part adolescent, part machine, an
amalgamated entity of adolescence and artificial intelligence that asserts power greater than that
of a human. AIDAN and Kady balance out each other’s deficiency, attaining a cooperation that
exceeds the requirements of the adult human. Kady/AIDAN together are rational and emotional,
make autonomous decisions, and fulfill the necessity of species—they exceed the minimum
humanist criteria of rationality, intentionality, and morality, but do so through hybrid identity
instead of the humanist self. Together, they defeat the pursuing enemy ship, the Lincoln, save
hundreds of lives, and survive extreme danger, at last accomplishing the victory that eluded the
human power. Their hybridity grants them a power that humanist principles forbid but that
posthumanist principles enable. Kady/AIDAN demonstrate Cary Wolfe’s argument that, in a

Williams 25
hybrid, “human functionality expands because the parameters of the cognitive system it inhabits
expand” (291); in other words, because Kady and AIDAN hybridize and develop distributed
identity, their capacities exceed the capacities of the humanist self. As Ostry suggests that some
protagonists in science fiction can do, Kady/AIDAN “achieve perfection not in their bodies but
in their ability to escape their bodies and connect with computers” (227)—a process that is
becoming more and more relevant as the technological capacity of adolescents increases.
The power of hybridity is further accentuated by Kady/AIDAN’s experience of it.
AIDAN’s representation of itself changes, as seen in the word image that depicts the Alexander
using the word “we,” thereby including AIDAN, the ship itself, and Kady in one system—the
adolescent/AI hybrid (Kaufman and Kristoff 522-523). Their merger develops distributed
cognition, an alternative maturation in which the body, mind, and environment work as a system.
Kady experiences hybridity as an anti-metaphysical transcendence of the humanist self, a
becoming one with a system that extends farther into the physical world, an integration of mind,
body, and machine; AIDAN experiences hybridity as a connection to the human-becoming aging
process of Kady’s adolescence. Both transformations overcome the essentialist human concept of
autonomous consciousness. Their maturation through hybridity develops from their subversion
of human authority by impersonation, through their assertion of power, and into birth as a new
being.
After having conquered what thousands of adults could not by destroying the ship that
pursued them, Kady and AIDAN, now reduced to only a small part of its former self in a
datapad, to mark the completion of their maturation through hybridization, arrive on the Hypatia.
Their arrival resembles the birth of a baby. A doctor “[hooks] his hands under [Kady’s] arms and
[pulls] her through the hatch” (Kaufman and Kristoff 585), extracting Kady and the datapad from
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a womb-like escape pod like a baby from the opening of a mechanical birth canal. Kady curls up
in the fetal position with the “datapad against her body” (585), as close as possible. The scene—
with the doctor, emergence through a narrow hatch, transfusions, food and fluids—mirrors a
birth, when the newborn must rely on others for everything. The only time Kady resists is when
the doctor attempts to take the datapad; the doctor reasons that “[she’ll] just keep soaking up the
rads. [She’ll] die” (585), suggesting that her new posthuman unity of mind, body, and machine
will kill her, a humanist perspective on her posthuman maturation. This is his last attempt to
prevent the emergence of a posthuman hybrid machine/adolescent, but is negated when Kady
and AIDAN are reunited. This marks the end of an existence which denied her power according
to labels of deficiency and fulfills a posthuman maturation that leaves her empowered, respected,
and in control of her own life.

Implications of Posthuman Hybridity in Criticism of Adolescent Literature
The ideological position that adolescents can obtain control over their lives through
posthuman maturation suggests an answer to Nancy Lesko’s questions about adult perceptions of
youth: “Can we work to enhance youths’ life conditions without the confident characterization
that youth are at a different psychological stage than adults? Can we work to improve youths’
life conditions without the hierarchy of adult over youth?” (13). Kaufman and Kristoff suggest,
through Illuminae, that adolescents can exert control over their lives only as they are free from
humanist age-dependent maturation and its associated deficiencies. Furthermore, by accepting a
posthuman conception of the human and accepting hybridity with technology, adolescents can
improve the circumstances of their lives without adults. They can reject the aeteronormativity
that defines their capacities as deficient in favor of an alternative maturation.
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Kaufman and Kristoff’s text challenges humanist ideology with alternative maturation, a
process accentuated by their narrative techniques which challenge typical narrative techniques in
young adult literature. Robyn McCallum and John Stephens argue that the form of narration
closely impacts the ideological system behind a text, and they note that distancing narration, such
as the narration in Illuminae, is rarely used in young adult fiction. Texts for adolescents typically
use a first-person narrative technique that associates the reader with the viewpoint character,
often reinforcing aeteronormativity by associating with that character the ideology that
adolescents require the help of adults to accomplish their objectives. Operating in contrast to
first-person narrative techniques, the narration of Illuminae, through recorded conversations,
found documents, and word-images, challenges traditional forms of young adult literature, a
fitting narrative technique to accompany a text that challenges humanist views of the human. The
frame story in which Kady/AIDAN, calling their distributed identity the Illuminae Group, are
distributing the documents places them in control of their own lives. Their interaction with
Beitech confirms that they have obtained control over their lives through hybridity: Beitech, in
the form of one of its executives, questions the hybrid as “just one little girl and a computer
screen” (Kaufman and Kristoff 590); however, Beitech legally recognizes the Illuminae Group
by fulfilling its contracted payment and by reading and considering the documents provided. The
frame story and the distancing narration takes an ideological position similar to Beitech in that it
accepts the possibility of an adolescent/AI hybrid producing and distributing the text. As this
ideological position is implied through the narrative techniques, a CYS critic seeking answers to
Lesko’s questions should look for other texts with alternative narrative techniques.
Illuminae not only challenges traditional narrative techniques in young adult literature,
but it also challenges ideologies towards technology in young adult science fiction. Positive,
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enabling, and empowering interaction with technology contrasts texts that ask adolescents to
reject technology. The trend of “asserting the liberal-humanist self against the threat that
biotechnology poses” (Ostry “Clones” 197)—a threat made visible in the dismantling of human
powers, such as Torrence, by machines and manufactured viruses and expressed in the robot
apocalypses of some science fiction—forms the typical ideological position of young adult
science fiction. The genre, in general, is anti-technology, serving as a warning of the dangers of
embracing technology. Critics have noted the trend across the genre, including in texts such as
M.T. Anderson’s Feed and Lois Lowry’s The Giver. Illuminae’s alternative approach broadens
the possibilities of the genre and technology. Critical approaches should look for ways in which
young adult science fiction enables youths in their lives through interaction and even hybridity
with technology. If technology can empower adolescents and expand their opportunities instead
of causing harm, then adolescents have options available other than the norms associated with
their age. Through literature such as this, adolescents can understand that age does not determine
identity. Maturation through hybridization with technology is “the kind of hope that science
offers” but “is largely not taken up by authors of...young adult books” (Ostry “Clones” 198)—
making it all the more important that critical approaches identify texts that do provide that kind
of hope. In answer to Lesko’s queries, a CYS critic should look for ways in which technology in
science fiction offers new possibilities for adolescents, how humanist and posthumanist
ideologies are interwoven in the text, and the potential for that text to overcome aeteronormative
practices.
While technology enables the kind of posthuman maturation I suggest here, critics of
young adult literature seeking answers to Lesko’s questions should seek out any form of hybrid
relationships that enable adolescents control and overcome humanistic adult control over them.
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Nonhuman beings often enable hybrid connection, but adolescents can develop distributed
identity with each other. The friendship in Rodman Philbrick’s Freak the Mighty could be
considered an enabling hybrid relationship; in Gary Paulsen’s Hatchet, the hatchet could fulfill a
role similar to AIDAN’s in enabling Brian’s survival. These kinds of distributed identity may
more adequately describe the systems of relationships that adolescents establish than the absolute
self of humanistic discourse, and they frequently improve life more than restrictive deficiencies
ascribed by humanist ideology. Texts that explore possibilities of alternative identity
development should be sought after for their ability to further explain the complexities of
adolescent life, analyzed for their ability to enable adolescent empowerment, and critiqued
according to their ideological positions regarding the human, age, and maturation.
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